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Abstract
We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with rm and technology dynamics to assess the
impact of a rich set of innovation policies. We explore the aggregate and cross-sectional effects of an R&D
tax credit, corporate taxes, and policies affecting rms' access to credit. Two main results emerge. First, the
aggregate impact of these policies is driven by general equilibrium effects operating via the government budget,
the labor market and via equilibrium entry of rms. In contrast, their stimulating effect on innovation and
productivity growth has a negligible impact on aggregate income and employment. Second, we nd that uniform
policies have heterogeneous effects on rms and their size distribution which generate rich feedbacks to the
aggregate economy.
Keywords: Firm dynamics, innovation policy, endogenous growth, business cycles.
JEL: F12, F13, O31, O41.
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1 Introduction
Innovation is the key engine of sustained productivity growth. Advanced countries grow by pushing the techno-
logical frontier and developing countries grow by catching up with that frontier. However, several economies,
including the US and many EU countries, have experienced a substantial slowdown in productivity growth since
the late 1970s. A key policy question is therefore whether governments can stimulate innovation and push
their countries out of the productivity trap. In this paper we assess the performance of a rich set of innovation
policies in a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms.
Allowing for multiple policies operating at the same is important because in reality government interventions
do not operate in isolation. Countries are often under the inuence of a wide set of policies from tax incentives
for R&D to research grants, from policies increasing the supply of human capital to intellectual property rights
protection and competition policy. Moreover, governments can also directly contribute to innovation by conducting
and funding basic research.
Similarly, it is crucial to analyze the above policies through the lens of amodel which allows for heterogeneous
rms. There are enormous differences across businesses even within the same industry. Most startups shut
down within the rst few years of their existence. Most of those that survive do not grow and out of those that
do expand, only a fraction regularly invest into R&D. A key advantage of our structural approach is that it allows
us to understand how uniform policies, common across all rms, affect different businesses and how this then
shapes aggregate economic trends and uctuations.
We build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with rm dynamics and technology adoption. The
economy is characterised by a technology frontier that grows exogenously, rms enter by investing resources
to obtain a vintage of the existing technologies and during their life time they keep investing to adopt a better
vintage and improve their productivity. If they fail to innovate they eventually exit, as expansions of the
technological frontier sustain a process of creative destruction.1 Technology adoption raises rms' productivity
which, in turn, leads to a gradual increase in consumption and wages. Therefore, faster technology growth has
opposing effects on rms, depending on their technology vintage. On the one hand, rms at the frontier enjoy
productivity gains larger than the increase in wage costs prompting them to create jobs. On the other hand,
rms which have not adopted the newer vintage experience only a rise in wages and as a result they shrink and
shut down more often. Moreover, a shock to aggregate productivity, common to all rms, generates business
cycle uctuations, making the model amenable to analyse the interaction between cycles and innovation policy.
We use this framework to analyse three policies potentially affecting the incentive to adopt new technology.
Corporate taxes, an R&D tax credit, granting rm a tax break for their innovation expenditures, and policies
aimed at improving access to nance. We assume that rms do not fully fund their entire R&D investment with
their cash ow and borrow part of it from nancial institutions.2 The presence of nancial frictions imply that
rms borrowing to upgrade their technology incur a nancing premium, which can be reduced by government
policy. We calibrate the model to French rm-level data, matching rm dynamics and aggregate features of the
economy, and conduct a set of experiments to explore the effects of these policies on rm-level and aggregate
outcomes.3
We obtain two main results. First, the aggregate effects of all policies are not driven by their success in
stimulating technology adoption and therefore productivity growth but they derive from general equilibrium
effects operating via labor supply and business entry. Second, although the policies are common to all rms,
the effects on technology adoption and other rm-level outcomes are heterogeneous, affecting rms differently.
These heterogeneous rm-level responses have important implications for the transmission mechanisms of
aggregate policy outcomes.
The R&D tax credit increases technology adoption and productivity but also reduces tax revenues, leading
to lower transfer, lower consumption and, via labor supply, lower wages. The decline in labor cost increases
rms' survival rate, thereby reducing the average productivity of the economy. These two forces largely offset
each other and average productivity changes little. By reducing exit, higher survival rate leads to an economy
populated by larger and older rms which, in turn, produces higher aggregate employment, capital and ultimately
output. The reduction in corporate taxes slows down technology adoption, as it operates like a reduction of
the tax credit for R&D. Its positive effect on aggregate output is driven by its impact on rm values. Lower
taxes increase rm protability thereby reducing exit rates and shifting the rm distribution toward larger rms.
Finally, lower credit frictions increase rms' survival probabilities which depresses average productivity, but also
increases rm values producing an effect of the opposite sign on productivity. In our baseline specication,
these two forces perfectly offset each other and productivity does not change. Moreover, higher survival rates
lead to lower exit rates shifting the rm distribution toward larger, older rms, which as in the case of the R&D
tax credit, drives the increase in aggregate output.
1We will use innovation and technology adoption interchangeably to indicate a rm's acquisition of a new technology vintage.
2Financial system play an important role for innovation as entrepreneurs may lack the wealth to self-nance their innovative ideas or
may be reluctant to bear all the risks [Aghion et al. (2018b)].
3Since we still miss some French statistics we preliminary complement the calibration using US data.
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1.1 Literature review
The paper is related to several lines of research in the literature. Bloom et al. (2019) presents a survey of the
empirical literature on innovation policy, condensing it in a toolkit for innovation policy makers. The policies are
ranked by means of a composite index of the strength and quality of the evidence and the magnitude of the
effects. Other criteria are whether the effects are likely to take place in the short or in the long run and whether
they will affect inequality. The R&D tax credit and direct public funding of research seem to be more effective
in the short run while human capital policies are more effective in the long run. Competition and trade policies
seem to have a small impact on innovation but they are cheaper in terms of public budget. The R&D tax credit
and trade policy tend to increase inequality, as the boost the relative supply of skilled labor, while human capital
policy have the opposite effect. We complement this line of work assessing the impact of different innovation
policy in a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
Our paper belongs to the emerging New Quantitative Growth Theory literature, where frontier endogenous
growth models are taken structurally to micro and macro data and used for quantitative analysis [e.g. Lentz
and Mortensen (2008), Akcigit and Kerr (2018)]. Our work is particularly related to Acemoglu et al. (2018) who
present a quantitative assessment of the effects of R&D subsidies in an endogenous growth model where rms
are heterogeneous in productivity (Klette and Kortum (2004)) and in innovation capacity. Tying the model closely
to US micro data and focusing on the steady state equilibrium, they show that R&D subsidies to incumbents
achieve modest increase in growth, subsidies to entrants and to xed operating costs reduce growth.4 The
most effective policy proves to be a tax on the xed operation costs of incumbents, which reduces the share
of low-innovation type of rms and increase the share of high-innovation rms.5 We complement this analysis
focusing on a wider set of policies, casting our experiment in a framework which can be potentially used to
analyse the interaction between innovation policies and business cycle uctuations.
There is surprisingly little work in the endogenous growth literature on the effects of corporate taxation. In
a second-generation endogenous growth model that does not feature scale effects, Peretto (2003) shows that
only scal policies operating via the interest rate affect the long-run growth rate of the economy while those
operating via market size do not. Corporate tax cuts are effective in stimulating growth as they operate via
the interest rate. Peretto (2007) extends the analysis going more granular on corporate taxation, distinguishing
between corporate income taxes, dividend taxes and taxes on capital gains. While these papers focus on theory,
recently Ferraro et al. (2011) take this class of models to the data, to capture historical patterns of US tax
policies and assess the impact of a rich set of scal policies on growth. They show that cutting taxes on capital
gains increases long-run growth, while tax cuts on corporate income and dividends have the opposite effects,
as they induce more entry thereby reducing innovation per rm, the key variable driving the growth rate. Our
contribution is to analyse corporate tax reforms in an economy with rm heterogeneity and business cycle
uctuations, and show that the effects of policy not only on the number but also on the size distribution of rms
have important aggregate implications.6
We make contact with the literature on the relationship between nancial systems and innovation-led
growth and in particular with the research on credit frictions in Schumpeterian growth models.7 Typically, this
line of research shows both theoretically and empirically that lower nancial frictions, or better access to credit,
have an unambiguously positive effect on economic growth and in particular on innovation-driven growth [Levine
(2005)]. Recent research incorporating rm-level modelling and data has highlighted a negative effect operating
via selection. Introducing credit constraints in a simplied version of Klette and Kortum (2004), Aghion et al.
(2018a) show that better access to credit has a direct positive effect on rms' innovation incentives and and
indirect reallocation effect allowing less innovative rms to survive, which reduces their incentive to innovate.
These two offsetting effects generate an inverted-U relationship between credit constraints and productivity
growth, which is also uncovered in French rm-level data. Exploiting a policy change that improved access
to credit, they show that rms affected by this policy increase their productivity growth but also experience
lower exit rates, especially those rms that were less productivie before the policy change. While they focus
4The positive direct effect of subsidies to incumbents on their innovation is in part offset by lower entry. First, higher incumbents'
innovation increases creative destruction thereby reducing the value of entry; secondly, it increases the demand for skilled workers and their
wage, thereby increasing the cost of entry. Subsidising incumbents xed operating costs reduces the exit rate, thereby producing a negative
selection effect which increases the proportion of low-innovation type rms and reduces growth. Finally, subsidising entry has negative
effects on growth as it discourages innovation by incumbents.
5The analysis is limited to closed economy. For quantitative analyses of R&D subsidies in open economy see Impullitti (2010), Akcigit et
al. (2018), and Borota et al. (2019).
6Ates and Safe (2018a) analyse corporate taxation in a Schumpeterian model where rms are heterogeneous in the quality jump
produced by innovation, they can be of high or low type. Entry is nanced externally and the rm type is unknown at entry. Financial
intermediators have access to a screening technology to get a signal of the entrant's type. Higher corporate taxes reduce entry, so the mass
of rms is lower but they also trigger stronger selection, as nancial screening is more intense. A lower mass of entrant reduces growth,
while the more intense screening increases the quality of the entrants, thereby increasing growth. This mass/quality trade off can lead to
negligible effects of taxes on growth.
7There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature exploring several channels through which nancial frictions can affect innovation
and growth. For a recent survey see Aghion et al. (2018b).
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on a simple deterministic steady-state model and reduced-form econometric analysis we propose a structural
quantitative approach which allows us to asses counterfactual scenarios.
Finally, our work is related to the recent literature bridging the growth and the business cycle approach to
macroeconomic analysis [Fatas (2000); Comin and Gertler (2006); Aghion et al. (2009), (2010), and (2014);
Nuno (2011); Anzoategui et al. (forthcoming); Bianchi et al. (2019)]. Aghion et al. (2010) study the role of credit
in smoothing business cycle uctuations by facilitating innovation. Financial systems that ease credit constraints
allow rms to borrow and make investments during recessions when the costs of investing are low but collateral
values are also low. Benigno and Fornaro (2018) provide a Keynesian growth theory, building a New Keynesian
model with innovation-driven growth and showing how pessimistic expectations can lead to persistent slumps
with high unemployment and weak growth, a `stagnation trap'. Severe depressions of aggregate demand reduce
rms' prots thereby weakening their incentives to innovate and reducing productivity growth. Productivity
growth affects households' future income, and a fall in future income generates a further reduction in current
aggregate demand. Weak demand pushes the interest rate to the zero lower bound andmonetary policy is unable
to restore growth and full employment. By affecting expected future growth, substantial subsidies to innovation
instead can push the economy out of the stagnation trap. We contribute to this line of research introducing rm
heterogeneity and exploring its role in shaping aggregate effects of a rich set of innovation policies.8 Sedlá£ek
(2019) sets up the baseline model on which we build, to show that counter-cyclical uncertainty uctuations are
a by-product of technology growth. We extend this model to incorporate nancial frictions and to accommodate
several policy instruments and explore their cross-sectional and aggregate implications.
2 Model
This section builds on Sedlá£ek (2019) and provides a tractable general equilibrium growth model with en-
dogenous rm dynamics, technology adoption, credit constraints and a government levying corporate taxes and
providing subsidies for technology investment.
In this model rms endogenously enter, exit and conditional on survival they grow over their life-cycle.
Throughout their life-cycles rms invest into adopting better production technologies which improve stochasti-
cally over time. However, a fraction of these costs must be paid upfront for which rms borrow from nancial
intermediaries subject to a collateral constraint. Finally, the model also includes a government which levies
corporate taxes on rms and in return provides subsidies and tax credits to rms' technology investments.
The main goal of the model is to understand how nancial constraints, corporate taxes and R&D subsidies
impact rms' decisions. Particular attention is paid to how these economy-wide policies and frictions impact
different rms and in turn how they shape the distribution and the aggregate level of R&D spending.
2.1 Household preferences and choices
The representative household chooses consumption, Ct, investment into physical capital It, and the supply of
labor, Nt on perfectly competitive factor markets.9 Following the indivisible labor models (see e.g. Hansen,
1985; Rogerson, 1988), labor is assumed to enter linearly into the household's utility function and is interpreted
as the employment rate. Formally, the per-period utility of the representative household is given by
lnC − υN, (1)
where υ > 0 is the disutility of labor and the preference specication allows for balanced growth. The repre-
sentative household maximizes the expected present value of life-time utility, subject to its budget constraint
C + I = NW +RK + Π + T, (2)
which states that total income stems from employment (with W being the competitive wage rate), renting out
of capital to rms (with R being the competitive interest rate) and from the ownership of rms, where Π are
aggregate prots. Finally, households also receive lump sum transfers from the government, denoted by T .
This total income is spent on consumption and investment into physical capital, where I = K ′ − (1− δ)K and
where δ is the depreciation rate,K is the stock of capital and primes indicate next period's values. The resulting
optimality conditions are given by
W = υC, (3)
1
C
= βE
1
C ′
(R′ + 1− δ) . (4)
8Ates and Safe (2018b) develop an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous rms and aggregate risk to study the productivity
effect of nancial crises. They show that credit shortages give rise to a quantity/quality trade off, as rms born during the crises are fewer
but produce higher quality goods.
9In what follows, aggregate variables are denoted by upper-case letters, while rm-specic variables are denoted by lower-case letters.
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2.2 Technology adoption, firm-specific productivity and growth
It is assumed that the frontier technology evolves exogenously according to the following process
lnZ ′ = Z + lnZ + ′Z , (5)
where Z > 0 is a positive drift term and Z are iid innovations distributed according to a Normal distribution
with zero mean and standard deviation σZ .
The productivity level of an individual rm i is denoted by zi. Each individual rm owns a particular vintage
of the frontier technology and therefore we can express individual rm productivity in terms of a particular
lag of the frontier technology, zi,t = vj,t = Zt−j with j ≥ 0. In addition, rms can attempt to improve their
prevailing productivity levels by investing into costly adoption of newer technology vintages. Because the frontier
is growing over time, an individual rm which fails to adopt newer technologies will experience a gradual decline
in relative productivity. At some point, such a rm will become so unproductive that it will no longer be protable
to remain in operation and it will shut down endogenously.
The investment into technology adoption is interpreted broadly, not only as direct costs of purchasing a well-
dened technology. In particular, the costs of technology adoption, or implementation, include e.g. those related
to identifying best practices, personalizing and implementing such practices at a specic rm, reorganizing
existing business procedures or aligning of incentives to use the new technology efciently (see e.g. Atkin et al.,
2017; Comin and Hobijn, 2007; Lientz and Rea, 1998). Because any of the above implementation requirements
may fail, investment into technology adoption is inherently uncertain.10,11
Following Klette and Kortum (2004), the various costs and resulting benets of technology adoption are
summarized using the following simple function. In particular, a rm investing r units of the nal good has a
probability p of adopting a newer technology vintage, where
pi =
(
ri
χ
) 1
η
γ
1− 1η
i . (6)
In the above expression, χ is a scaling factor, γi is the technology gap (or stock of knowledge) dened as
γi = zi/Z and 1/η is a curvature parameter.12 The associated cost function can be written as
Q(pi, γi) = χγi
(
pi
γi
)η
. (7)
As explained, if an incumbent rm fails to adopt a newer technology vintage, it retains its prevailing produc-
tivity level. Successful adoption attempts may lead to either radical or incremental technological improvements
[as in e.g. Akcigit and Kerr (2018)]. In particular, a fraction θ of rms adopting newer vintages adopt the frontier
technology, while all other adopting rms obtain the technology of the closest younger technology vintage.
Formally, if a rm i in period t has a productivity level of zi,t = vj,t = Zt−j , then its productivity in the next
period is described by
ln zi,t+1 =

vj+1,t+1 with probability 1− pi,t,
vj,t+1 with probability pi,t(1− θ),
Zt+1 with probability pi,tθ.
(8)
Finally, it is assumed that the process of technology adoption is the same for potential startups as it is for
incumbent rms. As a normalization, the stock of knowledge for potential entrants is assumed to be given by
the average stock of knowledge in the economy, γ. Startups are assumed to enter the economy only if they
manage to adopt the latest technology vintage.13
2.3 Firm behavior
Firm dynamics play a key role in this model. They feature endogenous rm entry and exit, an endogenous rm
productivity (and thus size) distribution and rm life-cycle growth. Let us rst describe these individual features
and then turn to the formal rm maximization problem.
10The assumption of gradual adoption of (frontier) technology is related to Comin and Gertler (2006). In contrast to the latter study
which assumes homogeneous rms (and competitive technology adopters), the primary focus of this paper is the time-varying distribution
of technology vintages across rms.
11An alternative interpretation of the uncertainty surrounding technology adoption is that in addition to expected adoption costs, rms
face heterogeneous and stochastic implementation costs. As new information about these costs emerges, rms may choose to abandon
adopting a technology that was protable in expectation (see e.g. Jack et al., 2015).
12An alternative modelling choice would be to assume that technology adoption costs are specied in labor units.
13Alternatively, it is possible to assume that startups are characterized by a particular distribution of initial technology levels.
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Incumbent rms differ in terms of their productivity levels which they can improve as described in Section
2.2. However, investment into technology adoption is hindered by nancial frictions. In particular, following
Manova (2013) it is assumed that a fraction of a rm's technology adoption costs must be paid upfront. These
costs are then borrowed from a nancial intermediary subject to a collateral constraint.
In addition, rms must pay corporate taxes on their prots. They do, however, receive (potentially size-
dependent) tax credits on their technology adoption costs from the government.
Conditional on their productivity level, rms produce output using labor and capital in a decreasing-returns-
to-scale production technology. The gradual nature of technology adoption together with the presence of
decreasing returns to scale in production result in a non-degenerate endogenous rm-level productivity (and
thus size) distribution.
In the data, however, productivity gaps alone cannot account for the observed average size differences
between young and more mature rms (see e.g. Foster et al., 2016). Therefore, to generate a realistic rm size
distribution, which will be quantitatively important for the aggregate dynamics of the economy, rms in this
model also grow over their life-cycles independent of their productivity levels.
In particular, it is assumed that rms accrue efciency gains, ψ, through learning-by-doing. These gains
are proportional to rm size and can be rationalized by for instance established long-term relationships, well-
developed distribution networks or better management practices (see e.g. Stein, 1997). This makes more mature
businesses, which do not necessarily operate cutting-edge technologies, competitive and able to fend off more
innovative newcomers.14
Finally, in addition to variable costs, rms must also pay stochastic xed costs of operation, φ. Businesses
endogenously shut down when the realization of the xed cost is too high rendering them unprotable.15
Formally, after observing aggregate shocks but prior to the realization of idiosyncratic operational costs,
an incumbent rm i of age a maximizes its discounted stream of all future prots (Va(zi,F)) by choosing
employment (ni,a), capital (ki,a) a technology adoption probability (pi,a) and by deciding whether or not to
remain in operation
Va(zi,F) = max
ni,a,ki,a,pi,a
∫
φ
max
[
0, V˜a(zi, φ,F)
]
dH(φ), (9)
where F is the aggregate state and V˜a(zi, φ,F) is the value of a rm conditional on a particular draw of
operation costs dened as
V˜a(zi, φ,F) =(1− τ)
(
Azi
(
kαi,an
1−α
i,a
)κ −Wni,a −Rki,a − φ
−Q(pi,a, γi)(1 + r˜d) + ψani,a
)
(10)
+Q(pi,a, γi)(1 + r˜d)ϕ(ni,a) + Eβ
C
C ′
Va+1(z′i,F ′),
where α and κ lie between 0 and 1 with the latter controlling the returns to scale in production and where
ϕ(ni,a) is a size-dependent tax-credit factor. Aggregate TFP, which affects all rms symmetrically, is given by
A′ = (1− ρ)A+ ρA+ A.
In addition, the term (1 + r˜d) reects costs of technology adoption resulting from nancial frictions. Specif-
ically, rms face liquidity constraints and they must obtain outside capital to fund a fraction d ∈ (0, 1) of their
technology adoption costs. Therefore, rms borrow dQ(pi,a, γi) from nancial intermediaries. A fraction ζ of
these costs is assumed to be invested in tangible capital and this fraction is pledged as collateral for the loan,
with ζ < d.
Because of imperfect contractability, rms will repay their loans only with probability µ ∈ (0, 1). In this case,
the lender receives Γ(Q(pi,a, γi)) = Γi,a. With the complement probability 1 − µ, rms default on their loans
in which case the lender is able to recover the collateral ζQ(pi,a, γi). Therefore, the total costs of technology
adoption can be written as
(1− d)Q(pi,a, γi) + µΓi,a + (1− µ)ζQ(pi,a, γi). (11)
In order for lenders to be willing to participate, it must be that the repayment Γi,a is sufciently large. In
particular, it must be that the returns from lending to rms are at least as large as the returns from investing
in the market at a rate r˜. Formally, this results in the following incentive compatability constraint
dQ(pi,a, γi)(1 + r˜) ≤ µΓi,a + (1− µ)ζQ(pi,a, γi). (12)
14In addition, modeling life-cycle growth using such deterministic efciency gains greatly simplies the computation of the model. The
reason is that it does not introduce additional state variables as would be the case with e.g. labor or capital adjustment costs at the rm
level.
15Note that as with expenditures on technology adoption, also ψ and φ are assumed to be paid in units of the nal good and therefore
they grow at the same rate as the rest of the economy.
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In equilibrium, free entry of nancial intermediaries results in (12) holding with equality which yields the
following expression for the value of the loan
µΓi,a = dQ(pi,a, γi)(1 + r˜ − (1− µ)ζ/d). (13)
Combining (13) with (11) results in the rm value expression in (10).
Given the perfectly competitive nature of the factor markets, the optimal rm-specic employment and
capital decision boil down to factor prices being equal to marginal products. In the case of the optimal
employment choice, rms also take into account efciency gains from learning-by-doing and the marginal
change tax credits
R =ακyi,a/ki,a, (14)
W =(1− α)κyi,a/ni,a + ψa + τ
1− τ
∂ϕ(ni,a)
∂ni,a
Q(pi,a, γi)(1 + r˜d). (15)
where individual rm output is given by yi,a = Azi
(
kαi,an
1−α
i,a
)κ
.
The point at which rms decide to shut down, φ˜i,a, is dened by the liquidity constraint faced by rms.
Specically, in order to continue operating, rms must be able to repay their lenders
yi,a −Wni,a −Rki,a − φ− (1− d)Q(pi,a, γi) + ψani,a + Eβ C
C ′
Va+1(z′i,F ′) ≥ Γi,a. (16)
Notice that the liquidity constraint applies to before-tax revenues.16 Using (13) results in the following
denition of the cutoff value for operational costs above which rms decide to shut down
φ˜i,a = yi,a −Wni,a −Rki,a −Q(pi,a, γi)(1 + λ) + ψani,a + Eβ C
C ′
Va+1(z′i,F ′), (17)
where λ = [(1 − µ)(d − ζ) + dr˜]/µ is the lending premium derived by combining the liquidity constraint (16)
and the participation constraint (12).
Finally, optimal technology adoption, both for incumbent rms and potential new entrants, equates the
marginal costs to the marginal benets of investing into newer technology vintages
χη
(
pi,a
γi
)η−1
(1 + r˜d) =
1
1− τ(1 + ϕ(ni,a))
∂EβC/C ′Va+1(z′i,F ′)
∂pi,a
, (18)
χη
(
pe
γ
)η−1
(1 + r˜d) =
1
1− τ(1 + ϕ(ne))θV0(Z,F). (19)
In the above, pe is the probability a potential entrant successfully adopts a newer technology, ne is startup
size and V0 represents the rm value of startups.17 Note that Va+1(z′i,F ′) incorporates the endogenous
evolution of rm-specic productivity as described by (8). To ease the exposition, formulas making this explicit
are presented only in the Appendix.
2.4 The firm distribution, market clearing, balanced growth and equilibrium
We can now dene ωj,a as the beginning-of-period mass of rms of age a and productivity vintage zj . In
addition, let there be a xed mass E of potential startups attempting to enter the economy in each period. The
distribution of rm masses across frontier technology vintages (j ≥ 0) and rm ages (a ≥ 0) can be described
16This assumption is made for computational convenience. If, instead, the liquidity constraint was on after-tax revenues, then all rm
decisions would depend on the particular realization of operational costs φ. This additional layer of heterogeneity would greatly complicate
the solution method.
17Notice that startups have exactly the same nancial constraint as incumbent rms. It is straightforward to assume that nancial
frictions are harsher for startups. This can be done by assuming that the fraction of technology adoption costs requiring external funding is
larger for startups than for incumbents, de > d.
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by
ω0,0 =Epeθ, (20)
ω′0,a+1 =
∑
a
∑
j
∫ φ˜j,a
pj,aθωj,adH(φ)
+
∑
a
∑
j≤a
∫ φ˜0,a
p0,a(1− θ)ω0,adH(φ)
ω′j+1,a+1 =
∑
a
∑
j
∫ φ˜j,a
(1− pj,a)ωj,adH(φ)
+
∑
a
∑
j≤a
∫ φ˜j+1,a
pj+1,a(1− θ)ωj+1,adHt(φ)
In the above, the rst expression describes the mass of startups entering the economy in each period. The
second expression gives the mass of rms older than one year, but which are nevertheless at the technological
frontier. Such rms are either last period's surviving adopters with radical improvements from any part of
the rm distribution (rst summation) or last period's surviving frontier rms which managed to adopt the
next younger vintage enabling them to keep up with technology growth (second summation). Finally, the third
expression denes the mass of rms at productivity levels below the frontier. These businesses are either last
period's surviving rms with productivity zj which did not adopt newer technologies (rst summation) or the
mass of last period's surviving rms with productivity zj+1 which adopted the next younger technology vintage
enabling them to keep up with technology growth (second line).
The labor and capital market clearing conditions and the aggregate resource constraint can be written,
respectively, as
N =
∑
j
∑
a
∫ φ˜j,a
ωj,anj,adH(φ), (21)
K =
∑
j
∑
a
∫ φ˜j,a
ωj,akj,adH(φ), (22)
Y = C + I + Ξ, (23)
where aggregate production Y =
∑
a
∑
j
∫ φ˜j,a ωj,a(yj,a + nj,aψa)dH(φ), which includes efciency gains
from learning-by-doing, is spent on consumption, investment into physical capital and aggregate costs Ξ =∑
a
∑
j
∫ φ˜j,a ωj,a (φ+Q(pj,a, γj)) dH(φ). The latter include operational costs and technology adoption ex-
penditures. Aggregate prots are then dened as Π = (1 − τ)[Y − WN − RK − Ξ] + Θ, where Θ =
τ
∑
a
∑
j
∫ φ˜j,a ωj,aϕ(nj,a)Q(pj,a, γj)(1 + r˜d)dH(φ). Finally, the government is assumed to run a balanced
budget
T + Θ = τ
∑
a
∑
j
∫ φ˜j,a
ωj,apij,adH(φ), (24)
where individual rm prots are dened as pij,a = (yj,a −Wnj,a −Rkj,a − φ−Q(pj,a, γj)(1 + r˜d) + ψanj,a).
Note that the frontier technology is the only source of growth and therefore the economy uctuates around
the stochastic trend Z .18 The aggregate state F consists of not only the aggregate capital stockK and the two
aggregate shocks A and Z , but also of the entire joint distribution of rm age and productivity vintages ωj,a.
The reason for the latter is that aggregate factor demands depend on the distribution of workers and capital
across rms with different productivity vintages and efciencies of operation (learning-by-doing gains) which
are age-dependent.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium). A competitive equilibrium for this economy is characterised by individual rms'
policy rules for employment (ni,a), capital (ki,a), technology adoption probabilities (pi,a) and rm exit (φ˜i,a),
potential entrants' policy rules for technology adoption probabilities (pe), household's policy rules for aggregate
consumption (C), employment (N ) and investment (I), the wage (W ), interest rate (R) and the distribution of
rms across technology vintages and ages (ωj,a), the nancial intermediaries' required loan repayment value
(Γi,a), which satisfy the following conditions: (i) rms' optimal labor, capital, technology adoption and exit
conditions (14) to (18), (ii) the free entry condition (19), household's optimal labor supply and Euler equations
18Only rm-level and aggregate employment are stationary. All other variables can be stationarized by dividing them with Z .
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(3) and (4), (iii) the aggregate resource constraint (23), which clear the labor and capital markets (21) to (22),
which satisfy the incentive compatability constraint (12) and which are consistent with the law of motion for the
distribution of rms across frontier technology vintages and ages (20).
3 Parametrization
The following paragraphs rst describe the model's calibration and then evaluate its performance on dimensions
not considered in the parametrization. In order to ease the exposition of the calibration strategy, we discuss the
calibrated parameters in relation to specic targets even though individual parameters typically inuence the
behavior of the entire model. All parameter values and the associated targets are presented in Table 1.19
In order to be consistent with the establishment-based uncertainty measure, the targeted moments are
computed using French establishment data taken from the ORBIS dataset using the period between 2009 and
2017. Following the frequency of the ORBIS data, the model period is therefore assumed to be one year.20
Let us start by discussing the parameters pertaining directly to the household. The discount factor, β, is set
to 0.97 corresponding to an annual interest rate of 3%. The disutility of labor, ν , is set such that the steady
state (stationarized) wage rate is normalized to one. The depreciation rate of physical capital is set to 10%,
consistent with U.S. values found in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
The parameters governing the process of technology adoption include the normalization constant χ, the
curvature parameter η and the probability of radical technology improvements θ. The normalization constant
affects the level of technology adoption costs. Proxying adoption costs with expenditures spent on research
and development, χ is set such that average adoption costs are 2.2% of output as in the data. The curvature
parameter is set to 2 implying a 0.5 elasticity of the probability of adopting a new technology vintage with
respect to the associated expenditures. This is consistent with estimates in Acemoglu et al. (2018). Finally, θ
is set to 0.1 following Akcigit and Kerr (2018) who estimate that roughly 10% of all innovations open up new
technologies.
Next, turning to the production function, α = 0.33 while the returns to scale parameter is set to κ = 0.8
which falls within the values estimated in Basu and Fernald (1997). The efciency gains from learning-by-doing,
ψa, directly affect establishments' life-cycle growth. To ease the computational burden, we consider four age
categories: startups, young (one to ve years), medium-aged (six to ten years) and old establishments (11
years and more).21 Efciency gains are then set in order to match average establishment size by age, relative
to the economy's average (with efciency gains of old establishments normalized to zero). The distribution of
the operational costs, H , controls the extent to which establishments exit the economy. It is assumed that H
is logistic with mean µH and scaling parameter σH . The former is set such that the average establishment
exit rate is 25%. The latter, which controls the dispersion of of operational costs and which in turn shapes the
relation between exit rates and rm-specic productivity, is pinned down by targeting the relative exit rate of
startups and young establishments of 1.5 observed in the data.
Financial frictions in the model are governed by r˜, d and ζ . To simplify the analysis, however, we assume that
nancial intermediaries have no outside option for their capital, i.e. r˜ = 0. This greatly simplies the analysis,
because what remains to be determined is the nancing premium λ, rather than d and ζ separately. We set λ
to 2% as in the data. The corporate tax rate is set to 28%, the statutory rate in France. The tax credit factor is
set to 1.32 as given by OECD data.
Finally, let us turn to the calibration of the aggregate shocks (A and Z). Aggregate TFP is characterized by
a level A, persistence ρ and standard deviation of productivity shocks σA. Frontier technology grows over time
with a positive drift Z and dispersion of frontier technology shocks σZ . These ve parameters are chosen such
that the model replicates the average establishment size, the persistence and volatility of real GDP, average
labor productivity growth and the reallocation that is attributable to entry and exit.
4 Results
This section uses the developed model to investigate the effects of three different scenarios: an increase in
R&D tax credits, a reduction in corporate taxes and a reduction in nancial frictions. All three scenarios are
conducted such that the change in the relevant parameter in the model is 5 percent. For example, the tax credit
is goverend by ϕ in the model. The baseline specication assumes that the credit is 32 percent, i.e. ϕ = 1.32.
Therefore, in our quantitative exercise we increase this to ϕnew = ϕ+ 0.05(ϕ− 1) = 1.336.
19The solution method follows Sedlá£ek and Sterk (2017) and its description is deferred to the Appendix.
20When computing business cycle statistics, the data is logged and HP ltered with a smoothing coefcient 100.
21While startups become young establishments in the next period (conditional on survival), young (medium-aged) establishments become
medium-aged (old) establishments with a probability δ = 1/5 ensuring an expected duration of ve years within these age categories
(conditional on survival).
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Table 2: Partial equilibrium impact of higher tax credits on business outcomes (in % relative to baseline)
simple n-weighted
p +4.7 +3.5
z +0.1 +0.2
n +4.4 +1.5
k +3.6 +1.4
y +3.6 +1.4
cR&D +9.4 +6.3
Notes: average rm-level outcomes (simple and employment-weighted) with p, z, n, k, y and cR&D denoting, respectively, probability of
technology adoption, rm-specic productivity, employment, capital, output and costs related to technology adoption. All values are in
percent relative to the baseline.
4.1 Higher R&D tax credits
We begin with a description of the effects of imposing higher tax credits for R&D expenditure of rms. The
mechanisms described here operate in similar fashion under the other two policy changes and we will therefore
devote more time to them here. In particular, it is instructive to separately discuss the effects of the tax
credit increase under partial and general equilibrium. In the former, we let rms change their individual choices
of employment, capital and investment into technology adoption, but we assume that exit decisions and in
particular the aggregate wage and the number of potential entrants remain xed at the values in the baseline
economy. In the latter, all endogeneous variables are allowed to adjust.
4.1.1 Partial equilibrium
Following an increase in tax credits to individual rms, businesses have higher incentives to invest into technology
adoption. This can be directly seen from (18) which allows us to derive the elasticity of the probability of
innovation with respect to the tax credit as22
p,ϕ =
∂pi
∂ϕ
ϕ
pi
=
ϕχητ
(η − 1)χη(1− τ(1 + ϕ)) > 0. (25)
All else equal (and in particular, holding the wage and exit decisions xed), higher tax credits lead to more
technology investment, and in turn a higher rate of technology adoption. This, in turn, shifts the distribution of
rms towards more productive businesses. This distributional change has large effects on average rm-level
outcomes, as summarized in Table 2. Now that rms adopt newer vintages of technology more frequently (top
row), average rm productivity increases (second row). The shift towards more productive rms also means that
businesses are on average larger and utilize more capital (third and fourth rows), which in turn raises average
output (fth row). However, these increases come at substantial costs. Because of increased incentives to invest
into technology adoption, the costs of doing so rise substantially (last row). Therefore, the net effect is not
immediately obvious and this is precisely what we discuss in the next subsection.
However, beforemoving on, it is worth highlighting the large differences between the simple and employment-
weighted averages in Table 2. The fact that employment-weighted averages are substantially smaller indicates
that much of the changes following the tax credit increase occur at small businesses. The fact that an economy-
wide policy has heterogeneous effects across businesses of different sizes is something that we will revisit
below.
4.1.2 General equilibrium
Let us start by going back to the last two rows of Table 2 which show that while the partial equilibrium increase
in average output is substantial, the associated costs are much larger.23 This is simply due to the fact that
technology adoption is not a bet on certainty. Only with an average probability of about 20 percent do businesses
adopt newer vintages of technologies (and this probability differs across rm size and age). Therefore, the change
in tax credits is likely to not be neutral from the point of view of the government budget. This spills over into the
22In the derivation we assume that the continuation value ∂Va+1(z′i,F ′)/∂pi is invariant to p. While this assumption is a good
approximation for a given age, the continuation value does increase between age groups with older rms have higher incentives to invest
into technology adoption simply because of their larger rm values. Nevertheless, the elasticity is positive for all age groups and roughly
constant across the productivity distribution.
23This result is likely sensitive to the assumption of exogenous growth. Under endogenous growth, extended tax credits may indeed
increase the overall growth rate and in turn raising tax income for the government.
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Table 3: General equilibrium impact of higher tax credits (in % relative to baseline)
Firm-level outcomes
p z n k y cR&D
+0.8 +0.0 +2.4 +1.7 +1.7 +2.0
Aggregate outcomes
W E Ω N K Y
−0.7 +1.4 +1.0 +0.3 +0.1 +0.1
Notes: Top panel shows rm-level averages, with p, z, n, k, y and cR&D denoting, respectively, probability of technology adoption, rm-specic
productivity, employment, capital, output and costs related to technology adoption. Bottom panel shows aggregate outcomes with W , E,
Ω, N ,K , and Y denoting, respectively, the wage rate, number of startups, number of rms, aggregate employment, aggregate capital and
aggregate output. All values are in percent relative to the baseline.
household decision making through the lump-sum transfers which, in turn, will affect the (general) equilibrium
wage rate. Indeed, under the current calibration the net tax change is negative implying that the lump-sum
transfers to the household drop (see equation 2). This directly impacts household consumption which, due to
the assumption of innitely-elastic labor supply implies that the wage rate also falls (see equation 3).
The decline in the wage rate has multiple effects on individual rms: i) it makes incumbents more inclined
to create jobs, ii) it makes it easier for incumbents to survive in the market, iii) it increases rm values and in
turn raises rm entry, iv) it makes labor relatively cheaper compared to physical capital. All these changes come
together and impact the equilibrium distribution of rms and in turn shape the aggregate economy. Table 3
presents the aggregate results, in percent relative to the baseline.
The top panel of Table 3 shows again rm-level (employment-weighted) averages. It shows that even
though the probability of technological innovation goes up, average rm-level productivity barely increases.
This is because of two opposing effects. On the one hand, the partial equilibrium impact of the increased
probability of technological adoption raises average rm productivity (as is apparent from Table 2). However,
the reduced wage means that now even relatively less productive rms are able to survive. This weakened
selection process leads to a lower average rm productivity. These two effects almost exactly cancel out in the
current parametrization.24
Nevertheless, the overall effect on the aggregate economy is positive. This does not operate through
improved productivity, but rather through general equilibrium effects. In particular, the decreased wage makes
rms operate at a larger scale. Average rm size increases, as does the amount of rm-level capital (even
though capital intensity declines due to a shift towards the cheaper factor of production). As a result, average
rm output increases. However, this is not the only effect. The lower variable costs and improved chances of
survival (partly due to higher probabilities of adopting new technologies) result in rm entry becoming more
attractive. The number of businesses increases further raising aggregate output.25,26
4.1.3 Heterogeneous effects of homogeneous policies
In this subsection, we return to the topic of heterogeneous effects of an economy-wide policy. The difference
between the changes in simple- and employment-weighted averages already hints at the fact that different
rms are being affected in different ways by the common policy change. To visualize this, Figure 1 shows the
percent changes in several rm-level outcomes as a function of relative productivity (γi = zi/Z).
The top panels of Figure 1 show the change in rm-level employment and capital following the increase in
tax credits. Firms across the productivity spectrum choose to increase both employment and capital. Since these
decisions are static, they are not a result of greater chances of productivity growth in the future. Instead, this
increase is a result of the lower wage, an indirect general equilibrium effect. The fact that rms are all reacting
to the same drop in variable costs also explains why rms across the productivity distribution raise their factor
inputs by the same percent amounts. The fact that employment rises by more than capital input is a result of
a relative price change. Due to the drop in wages (and an unchanged cost of capital), labor becomes relative
cheaper and rms substitute towards it in their production mix.
24By increasing rm values, lower wages also produce an additional incentive to increase innovation which in the benchmark economy is
not strong enough to overturn the negative selection effect.
25The reason why aggregate output increases by less than average rm-level production is that aggregate output is net of all paid costs
which also increase.
26The fact that increasing tax credits raises aggregate output is a result of government taxes being a distortion. Reducing government
taxes, and tax credits, to zero increases aggregate output considerably more than the analyzed scenario. This is despite the presence of the
nancial friction.
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Figure 1: Heterogeneous effects of the R&D tax credit
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Notes: the panels show changes (in percent) in rm-level employment (ni), capital (ki), the probability of adopting newer vintages of
technology (pi) and the survival rate (H(φ˜i)) as a function of the distance from the frontier, or relative productivity γi = zi/Z .
The bottom panels show the changes in the probability of adopting newer vintages of technologies and
the survival rates by rm-level productivity. In contrast to the top panels, these variables highlight the clearly
heterogeneous effects a rise in tax credits, which is common to all rms, has on different rms. The reason for
the difference between the variables in the top and bottom panels comes from the fact that while employment
and capital are static decisions, investment and exit decisions are dynamic and take into account future chances
of survival and productivity growth. The latter are then heterogeneous across rms, depending on their relative
position in the productivity distribution. Survival rates depend on the expected level of rm values (see eq. 17)
which increase with productivity. In contrast, the probability of adopting newer technologies depends on the
expected difference in rm values when successful and when not (see eq. 18). The latter generally decreases
with productivity as the potential improvements upon successful technology adoption decrease the closer a rm
is to the frontier to begin with.27 Therefore, the impact of higher tax credits is increasing (decreasing) in relative
productivity for survival rates (adoption probabilities).
The increase in R&D tax credit then produces a stronger stimulus to innovate for less productive (and small)
rms than for large, productive, rms. Recall that the former, on the one hand, have more ground to cover
as they are further behind the technology frontier, so they can potentially obtain larger innovations. On the
other hand, their innovation intensity (R&D to sales ratio) is smaller compared to more productive rms. This
tension between innovation potential and innovation scale is a key determinant of the role of rm heterogeneity
in shaping the aggregate effects of innovation policy. In our benchmark economy, the tax credit shifts the rm
distribution toward small, less productive, rms thereby increasing their innovation relatively more than for more
productive rms. The negligible effect on productivity then suggests that the innovation scale margin prevails.
Consequently a policy that shifts the rm distribution toward rms with lower innovation expenditure is unlikely
to stimulate productivity growth.
The gure highlights two important points. First, even economy-wide policy changes which are common to
all rms may have heterogeneous effects. Hence, a country's rm size and productivity distribution represents
an important statistics guiding policy decisions. The results of our benchmark simulations suggest, for example,
that an R&D tax credit is more likely to be effective in enhancing productivity in a country mostly populated by
small and young rms. Second, rm-level changes, which eventually shape the aggregate response, are driven
by indirect, general equilibrium, effects (in this case a change in the wage rate).
27This result would change in the case of endogenous growth where even the most productive rms can grow further.
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Table 4: General equilibrium impact of lower corporate taxes and financial frictions (in % relative to baseline)
Firm-level outcomes
p z n k y cR&D
corporate taxes −3.8 +0.0 −10.1 −7.2 −7.2 −8.8
nancial frictions +0.2 +0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1 +0.3
Aggregate outcomes
W E Ω N K Y
corporate taxes +3.5 −6.8 −4.1 +0.6 +1.3 +1.3
nancial frictions +0.1 −0.1 −0.0 +0.1 +0.1 +0.1
Notes: Top panel shows rm-level averages, with p, z, n, k, y and cR&D denoting, respectively, probability of technology adoption, rm-specic
productivity, employment, capital, output and costs related to technology adoption. Bottom panel shows aggregate outcomes with W , E,
Ω, N ,K , and Y denoting, respectively, the wage rate, number of startups, number of rms, aggregate employment, aggregate capital and
aggregate output. All values are in percent relative to the baseline. Corporate taxes denote the case of a 5% decrease in the corporate
tax rate τ , while nanical frictions denote the case of a 5% decline in the external nancing premium λ.
4.1.4 Robustness
Next, we check the robustness of our results to larger changes in the tax credit. We report the results in Figures
C.1 to C.3 in the Appendix. All results are essentially conrmed, the only non linerity can be observed with
the effect on the average productivity which is slightly U-shaped. This result hinges on the opposite forces
operating on productivity discussed above. For larger increases in R&D tax credit the general equilibrium effects
via goverment tax revenues becomes stronger, thereby producing a larger decline in transfer, consumption and
ultimately wages. This in turn increses entry and the distribution of rms shifts towards younger rms. However,
while startups are on average more productive, they are small. The largest employment weight in the economy
is held by old rms. These rms are actually relatively productive compared to young/medium-aged rms, as
the reason for making to old age is that they were successful in innovating. So, the shift away from these to
younger rms is driving the employment-weighted decline in productivity.
4.2 Lower corporate taxes
Let us now turn to the case of lowering corporate taxes. The mechanisms described in the previous section
all work in the same way. However, lower corporate taxes have two opposing (direct) effects on rms. On the
one hand, they increase after-tax prots and in turn (all else equal) they raise rm values. However, lower
corporate taxes also reduce the effective tax credits, since they are not only proportional to the amount spent
on technology adoption but also on the corporate tax rate itself. Therefore, lowering of corporate taxes also has
the opposite effects of decreasing tax credits. It is a quantitative question which of these two effects dominates.
In partial equilibrium (holding wages and exit decisions constant), a decrease in corporate taxes reduces
investment into technology adoption. Once again, this can be seen from (18). Lowering taxes has essentially
the same effect as reducing tax credits. Lower chances of adopting newer vintages of technology then results
in a shift of the distribution of rms towards less productive businesses. This, in turn, reduces all rm-level
outcomes despite the fact that static decisions, such as hiring of labor and capital is unaffected by the policy
change (see equations 14).
The case of general equilibrium is somewhat more complex. In response to lowering taxes, expenditures
on technology adoption also fall (both in terms of governmental transfers and in terms of the magnitude of
resources spent by rms). This leads to an increase in consumption and through the household's optimal labor
supply also a rise in the wage rate. The latter, however, then makes rms shrink their size (see top row of Table
4).
There are countervailing forces on rm values. While higher wages help decrease rm values, lower corporate
tax rates serve to increase them. Under the current calibration, rm values indeed increase across the rm
distribution. This means that rm exit rates fall, resulting in a shift towards older, larger businesses. This shift
in the rm distribution is crucial for the aggregate results, where aggregate employment, capital and output all
increase (see Table 4).28,29
28Despite the drop in exit rates, the number of rms falls because rm entry also declines. Even though the value of startups rises
because, as incumbents, also potential entrants nd it harder to adopt new technologies (enter).
29Note that Table 4 reports employment-weighted rm-level averages. Unweighted average employment, capital and output increase
explaining the rise in aggregate employment, capital and output despite the fall in the number of rms.
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4.3 Lower financial frictions
Finally, we discuss the case of lowering nancial frictions. All else equal, nancial frictions only affect rms'
exit decisions. A lower external nancing premium makes it easier for rms to survive. However, this partial
equilibrium effect is not the only consequence of the change. In general equilibrium, the wage rate increases.
The reason for this is that with fewer rms shutting down, the rm distribution shifts towards older, larger, rms
(see second row of Table 4). This raises output and in turn consumption. The latter increases the wage rate via
the household's optimal labor supply decision. Despite the increase in survival rates, the higher variable costs
are quantitatively more important for young rms and therefore startups are somewhat discouraged from entry.
These two opposite forces, lower exit and entry rates, offset each other, leaving the number of rms essentially
unchanged (last row of Table 4).30
Once again, the positive effect of the policy on output does not operate via the technology adoption and
productivity channel. There are two opposite effects on productivity essentially offsetting each other. First,
by increasing rms survival rates, the cheaper access to credit allows less productive rms to survive thereby
reducing aggregate productivity. Second, the increase in survival rates also prop up rms values thereby raising
the incentives to adopt new technologies which impact average productivity positively. The positive effect of
reducing the credit frictions on aggregate output is driven by its effect on rms' survival probability which shifts
the distribution toward older, larger rms.
5 Taking stock and future research
Our results show that all three policies we have analysed can help the economy reach higher levels of activity
but, interestingly, not via a faster pace of innovation. The R&D tax credit has positive direct impact on rms
technology adoption and productivity which is offset by its general equilibrium effect on tax revenues. Lower tax
revenues imply lower transfer leading to lower consumption and, via labor supply, to lower wages. The reduction
in the cost of labor increases rms' survival rate, thereby reducing the average productivity of the economy. The
positive effect on income derives from the increase in rm size and age, brought about by the higher survival
rate. The reduction in corporate taxes has a negative effect on the adoption of new technologies as it essentially
operates as a reduction of the tax credit for R&D. The positive effect on aggregate output comes from its impact
on rm values. Lower taxes increase rms values thereby reducing exit rates and shifting the rm distribution
toward larger rms. Finally, lower credit frictions increase rms' survival probabilities which depresses average
productivity, but also increases rm values producing an effect of the opposite sign on productivity.
Although in part due to the specic parametrization, the neutrality result of these different policy with respect
to productivity is stimulating starting point for future research. Below, we discuss some of the results from a
modelling perspective and propose extensions which could overturn the policy neutrality. The key features of
the model, through which much of the effects operate, include the labor supply elasticity, the entry elasticity,
and the way we model R&D expenditure and growth. Let us briey discuss each of these.
5.1 Labor supply and firm entry elasticities
From the results it is apparent that much of the effects operate through general equilibrium effects. One
such channel works through the equilibrium price of labor which, in turn, determines relative costs of inputs in
production but also rm values. The latter affects exit rates, incentives for innovation and entry.
The current model assumes an innite labor supply elasticity, making the wage sensitive to changes in
consumption. Alternative assumptions, ideally grounded in empirical evidence on responses of employment to
similar policy changes, may be a fruitful avenue for future research.
The same can be said about the elasticity with which rms enter the economy. The model assumes free
entry, albeit with an endogenous probability. Allowing for instance for a nancial friction parameter for startups
which differs from that of incumbents is yet another realistic extension to the current framework.
5.2 Technology investment and growth
Costs of investing into newer technology vintages are assumed to be paid in units of the nal good. In reality,
these costs are often in terms of (research) labor units. Therefore, allowing for (part) of these costs to be
counted as employment is a useful extension. Quantitatively, this may also prove to be important because of
the important role the labor market plays in the indirect general equilibrium effects discussed above.
Finally, let us discuss the modelling of aggregate growth. The baseline model is based on exogenous growth
as the frontier technology level evolves exogenously according to (5). In what follows we describe how this
30This result could be different if would have different policies for incumbents and entrants. We plan to implement this extension in
future research.
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assumption can be relaxed and instead growth can be endogenized via rms' decisions to invest in productivity
enhancing R&D activities.
5.2.1 Innovation
The majority of the baseline setup can be retained. However, it is useful to redene γi = zi/z as the rm
specic productivity level relative to average rm-specic productivity z = 1/Ω
∑
i zi, where Ω is the mass of
all active rms.
In addition, the main difference being that instead of investing into technology adoption, rms invest into
innovation. The cost of R&D can have the same functional form as described in (7) which we repeat here for
convenience
Q(pi, γi) = χγi
(
pi
γi
)η
. (26)
In return for investing Q(pi,a, γi) units of the nal good into R&D, rms have a probability pi,a of innovating
upon their current productivity level. Specically, with probability pi,a the rm specic productivity level becomes
z′i = zi(1 + λ), where λ is the growth rate in rm-level productivity or the so-called innovation step size. With
the complement probability 1 − pi,a rms retain their previous productivity level. Therefore, the evolution of
rm-specic productivity can be summarized by
zi,t+1 =
{
zi,t(1 + λ) with probability pi,t,
zi,t with probability 1− pi,t.
(27)
As before, potential entrants face the same innovation technology as incumbents. However, only those that
successfully innovate enter the market. In addition, it is assumed that potential entrants innovate upon the
average productivity level z. Therefore, the free entry condition becomes
χη
(
pe
γ
)η−1
(1 + r˜d) =
1
1− τ(1 + ϕ(ne))V0(z(1 + λ),F) (28)
5.2.2 Balanced growth
Assuming that the economy is on a balanced growth path, we can express the economy-wide growth rate as
1 + g =
z′
z
=
1
Ω
[∑
i
∑
a>0
Hi,a(1 + λpi,a) +
∑
i
∑
a=0
Hi,0pe(1 + λ)
]
. (29)
The above states that average productivity increases because of incumbents' R&D efforts (rst term) and
because of successful startups (second term). The former can be seen from the fact that expected rm-level
productivity next period is given by E[z′i,a+1] = pi,azi,a(1 +λ) + (1− pi,a)zi,a = zi,a(pi,a + pi,aλ+ 1− pi,a) =
zi,a(1 + pi,aλ).
Finally, because rm-level innovation is the only source of growth, it can be shown that all growing variables
grow at the same rate g dened above.
5.3 Further extensions
5.3.1 Innovation policy and the business cycle
Our model is rich enough to allow us analyse the interaction between growth and business cycle. A further
avenue for future research is then to study the interplay of structural policies, such as those analysed here,
and business cycle uctuations. Innovation can make rms more resilient in turbolent times. There is a growing
literature on rm characteristics fostering resilience to shocks.31 A few recent papers focus on the role of
innovation. Hombert and Matray (2018) show that R&D intensive US manufacturing rms downsized relatively
less in response to increasing Chinese import competition. Gupta (2019) nd that more innovative Spanish rms
were less affected by the recent crisis compared to non-innovative rms.
Innovation can strengthen rm resilience to shocks by allowing smaller cuts in prot margin to stay com-
petitive, differentiation via the introduction of new products and more in general by being more exible and
adaptable to new market scenarios. In future research we plan to explore the potential role of the several
innovation policies implemented by the EU in shaping rms' and aggregate response to short to medium-run
uctuations.
31Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows that access and quality of available credit were key in allowing rms to weather the Great Recession.
Aghion et al. (2017), nd that more decrentralised rms took smaller hits in the same recession. Other rm characteristics such as size
(Fort et al. (2013)), ownership and governance structures (Alviarez et al. (2018), Alfaro and Chen (2012)) have been shown to be important
in shaping rms' response to large negative shocks.
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5.3.2 Granular policies
We have only focused on uniform policies which do not differentiate by rm size, productivity or age. In
future research we plan to explore state-dependent policies which will be differentiated according to the rm
characteristics they are designed to target. Financial constraints are often considered a key market failure
mainly affecting young and small rms. Therefore, credit policies aimed at mostly, or exclusively, these types
of rms might be more desirable. The R&D tax credit in many countries treats small rms more generously
(OECD (2018)). Small rms seem to be more responsive to innovation policy than other rms (Criscuolo et al.
(2019)). Size-dependent policies though carry their own specic problems. They discourage rms from growing
and they often target size and not age which is arguable the more relevant feature for growth (Bloom et al.
(2019)). The model can already deal with tax and tax heterogeneity across rms and differentiating the credit
frictions between entrants (young rms) and incumbents is a straightforward extension.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with rm and technology
dynamics to analyse a rich set of innovation policies. Technology dynamics is produced by rms' decision
to adopt new technologies that are periodically available in the economy thanks to an exogenously growing
technology frontier. We used this framework to explore the aggregate and cross-sectional effects of an R&D tax
credit, corporate tax cuts, and policies aimed at improving rms' access to credit. We show that aggregate effects
of these policies are driven by general equilibrium effects operating via government budget, the labor market
and via equilibrium entry. While their stimulating effect on innovation has a negligible impact on aggregate
income and employment. Moreover, we nd that uniform policies have heterogeneous effects on rms and their
size distribution which generate rich feedbacks to the aggregate economy.
The R&D tax credit increases innovation but since it is nanced by a reduction in government transfers it
depresses wages which, in turn, increase rms survival rate, thereby producing a negative effect on productivity.
Its stimulating effect on output is obtained through a shift in the rm size distribution toward older and large
rms. Corporate tax cuts and improved access to credit broadly affect the economy via similar mechanisms.
Common to all policies are two general equilibrium mechanisms. The rst is a mass-productivity trade-off, as
by reducing rms' costs or increasing the after-tax rms' value government intervention increase the survival
rate thereby reducing average productivity and, on the other end, it reduces entry shifting mass toward the
right tail of the rm size distribution. The second is produced by the assumption that government budget is
always balanced, and any change in innovation policies is sterilised with an opposite and equivalent change in
lump-sum transfers. This sterilisation via transfer impacts wages via labor supply with produces rich general
equilibrium feedbacks.
The model is amenable to many extensions. The wage is very sensitive to policy due to our assumption of
innite labour supply elasticity. Removing this assumption and disciplining this elasticity with the data we can
give us a more accurate quantitative wage response. Introducing an endogenously growing technology frontier
will possibly strengthen the direct effect of policy-induced rms' increase in innovation on aggregate income
level and growth rate. The model can also already be used to analyse the interaction between policies and
business cycle uctuations and, with some minor changes, to move from uniform to state-dependent policies.
Finally, an interesting line of future research could explore different sterilisation mechanisms for the government
budget (e.g. other types of taxes instead of transfers) and also explore the implication of temporarily nancing
the innovation policies with budget decit.
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Appendix
A Solution method
The structural model is a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous rms. Individual businesses must
know the entire distribution of rm productivity and employment levels in order to be able to forecast the
development of the wage rate, a key variable in their optimization decisions. In addition, the presence of an
aggregate shock makes these rm distributions time-varying rendering the solution of the model challenging.
The method employed in this paper follows that developed in Sedlá£ek and Sterk (2017). The procedure is
based on rst-order perturbation along the stationary steady state life-cycle dynamics of individual rms, which
depend on the evolution of their rm-specic productivity values. Notice that without persistent idiosyncratic
shocks and without adjustment costs, all rms with the same productivity level will make the same decisions.
Therefore, it is possible to treat a particular distance from the technological frontier as a separate rm type.
To economize on notation, we can express the model compactly as:
Etf (yt+1, yt, xt+1, xt; Υ, ζ) = 0
where xt is a vector containing the state variables (all variables in St) and yt is a vector containing the non-
preditermined variables, Υ is a vector containing all parameters of the model and ζ is a scalar parameter pre-
multiplying the covariance matrix of the shock innovations, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). Importantly,
the above is system of a nite number of expectational difference equations.
A.1 Solving for the steady state without aggregate uncertainty
One rst solves for the equilibrium of a version of the model without aggregate uncertainty. That is, I nd
vectors y and x that solve f (y, y, x, x; Υ, 0) = 0. As described in the main text, the calibration targets various
parameters to match long-run statistics. The calibration procedure has the following steps:
1. given values for the technology types (i.e. technology gaps), the aggregate wage rate (W ), the technology
adoption probability (p) and the distribution of rm-specic operational and adjustment costs (H(µh, σH)
and ψ), one can calculate the growth paths of rm-level employment, rm values and the endogenous
exit rates.
2. given rm values and exit rates from (1.) and a normalization of the mass of entrants, it is possible to
back out the entry cost and to compute the distribution of rm masses across technology types.
3. given the mass of rms in all technology types from (2.) and their optimal choices from (1.) and (2.), it is
possible to compute all aggregate variables.
A.2 Solving for the equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty
Next, one can solve for the dynamic equilibrium using rst-order perturbation around the stationary steady state
(including the steady state life-cycle patterns of rms) found in the previous step. The rst-order approximated
solutions, denoted by hats, have the following form:
x̂t+1 = x+ Θ
∗ (x̂t − x)
ŷt+1 = y + Φ
∗ (x̂t − x)
where Θ∗ and Φ∗ are matrices containing the coefcients obtained from the approximation. The perturbation
procedure is standard and carried out in one step.
An advantage of perturbation methods is that the computational speed is relatively high and many state
variables can be handled. An important prerequisite for perturbations to be accurate, however, is that deviations
from the steady-state are not too large. For rm dynamics models like the one in this paper it may seem
problematic because differences in employment levels across rms may be very large. The solution method
adopted here, however, overcomes this problem since the steady state we perturb around contains the entire
life-cycle proles of rms. These growth paths, captured by the constants in the above equations, are themselves
non-linear functions of technology types.
Hence, the fact that most newborn rms starts off much below their eventual sizes does not involve large
accuracy losses since the same is true for the steady-state sizes of newborn rms. Similarly, the fact that
the equilibrium features various rm types with very different optimal sizes does not reduce accuracy since we
perturb around the growth path for each individual rm type.
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B Details of firms' first order conditions
This subsection provides more detailed expressions for the rms' rst order conditions presented in the main text.
Specically, it makes explicit the evolution of rm specic productivity. Let us rewrite the rst order conditions
in terms of rm-specic productivity levels dened by the age of the technology vintage operated by the rm,
zj,t = Zt−j . The optimal expenditures on R&D for incumbent and potential new rms, respectively, are given by
χη
(
pi,a
γi
)η−1
(1 + r˜d) =
1
1− τ(1 + ϕ(ni,a))Etβt
 θVa+1(Zt+1,Ft+1)+(1− θ)Va+1(zj,t+1,Ft+1)
−Va+1(zj+1,t+1,Ft+1)
 ,
C Robustness
Figure C.1: R&D tax credit and firm-level outcomes
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Figure C.2: R&D tax credit and average firm-level outcomes
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